What Role Does an Estate Tax Have in a Meritocracy?

The appeal of a meritocratic system runs deep in American society. We believe that this country should be one where everyone gets a chance. "Equality of opportunity" has become the phrase of choice when approaching what composes a just system of distribution. If everyone starts from the same place, then let them end up where their merits take them. Thus we believe that people should have the right to reasonably exercise control over property that they gained from an initial position of equality with others.

The question of the levying of an estate tax, however, provides a challenge to this meritocratic premise. On the one hand, an estate tax can be construed as seizing the earned property of an individual who justly acquired it. While an argument can be put forth that property rights do not carry on past the grave, it's a strange argument to say that I could transfer my property whatever way I choose while still alive but that I could not, while alive, will my property to certain ends contingent upon my death. Most reasonable people would agree that individuals have a right to some control of their property after death. If I earned my property starting from a position of equality, then the meritocratic prerogative is for me to have control over the transfer of that property.

On the other hand, the ability to collect on an inheritance is a challenge to the meritocratic system. No one is given a chance to choose or "earn" their parents, but regardless, they most often find themselves as the primary beneficiaries of their parents' inheritances. Some may say that children "earn" the inheritance of their parents through love, affection, etc., but children are, by their relationship to their parents, already in a position to provide this love, affection, etc. that puts them in an initial position of inequality with others. Thus, bestowing inheritance stands at odds with meritocratic values.

How can this apparent contradiction be resolved?

One philosopher who provides a pertinent perspective on this case is John Rawls. In his seminal work A Theory of Justice, Rawls points out that our qualities that make up what we call our "personality," qualities such as intelligence, social skills, and work ethic, come to us as a result of luck. We have no control over our genetic endowment or our environment, so however we end up is of no merit of our own. Thus, a Rawlsian analysis of the estate tax would conclude that the estate tax is inherently just as a method of balancing inequalities that arise from unequal distribution of personality assets.

Through this line of reasoning, Rawls explicitly rejects a meritocratic political philosophy. This assertion is highly controversial and came under fire from philosophical libertarians such as Robert Nozick as well as critics of classically construed liberalism such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel. The overarching argument made by both sides is that it is nonsensical to say we could ever fully separate ourselves from our qualities. To say that there is some "me" that cannot be described by my intelligence, social skills, work ethic, sense of humor, interests, or background is an abstraction that tests the bounds of the meaning of "identity," and in the opinion of Nozick, MacIntyre, and Sandel, shatters it.

To say that there is a "me" that has no claim over the fruits of my labor is incorrect. Rawls cannot be dismissed so easily, though. Just because an individual can be established to have some claim over her property does not necessarily mean that this individual has a claim to all her property at the expense of everyone else's. No matter what position of equality one begins in, a system of public infrastructure is necessary to provide for the opportunity for individuals to flourish economically, socially, and politically, and that infrastructure requires public upkeep. This balance was well articulated by Senator Elizabeth Warren in a 2011 speech (fast-forward to 0:50).



What does this mean for the estate tax? It means that it would be unjust to tell people that they have no claim to provide their children with some inheritance with which to be comfortable and launch their lives. But it would be equally unjust to say that some of that money cannot be used to help other children in the community do the same. No fortune is dug out of the mud by an individual alone. A meritocracy depends on a social infrastructure to function, and infrastructure needs taxes.

Why I Don't Use the Word "Communitarianism"

In yesterday's Washington Post, sociologist and journalist E.J. Dionne published an incisive op-ed concerning the modern GOP's decision to turn away from the traditional conservative value of community. In the op-ed, Dionne talks about the tension between American commitment to individualism and the commitment to community life by saying that "we are communitarian individualists or individualistic communitarians, but we have rarely been comfortable with being all one or all the other."

While thinkers like Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer are often lumped into the category of "communitarian," Dionne's use of the word is an illustration of the reason that these philosophers routinely reject the label. "Communitarianism" is often described as a foil to liberalism. These thinkers are described as critics of liberalism at its foundation, offering a new way of thinking that is fundamentally opposed to the liberal thesis. The basis of this supposed critique is that liberalism considers the individual as primary and that communitarianism concerns the primacy of community.

A look at these thinkers, however, shows that this view is an oversimplification of their true positions. MacIntyre, in his 1999 book Dependent Rational Animals, places special importance on the individual's ability to exercise "independent practical reason." Taylor, in The Ethics of Authenticity, iterates the importance of authentic individuality for flourishing. Even Walzer in Spheres of Justice lays out a system of justice that is focused on goods accrued to individuals.

The takeaway from this is that the thinkers and the philosophical tradition that is often labeled "communitarian" is not the antithesis to individualism that Dionne describes, but is rather a position that supports Dionne's thesis. MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor, and Walzer are not critics of liberalism at its most fundamental level, but are rather offering critiques within liberalism.

Thus, the use of the phrase "communitarian" does little more than to reinforce misconceptions and cause confusion. It would be nice if there were some catch-all phrase to describe the philosophy of this critique, but at this point there is not, so the best we can do is shy away from a label that does nothing but obfuscate the positive contributions of the cause.